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Unlikely Bedfellows? Collingwood, Carnap and the internal/external distinction1 
Abstract. Idealism is often associated with the kind of metaphysical system building which was 
successfully disposed of by logical positivism. As Hume’s fork was intended to deliver a serious blow 
to Leibnizian metaphysics so logical positivism invoked the verificationist principle against the 
reawakening of metaphysics, in the tradition of German and British idealism. In the light of this one 
might reasonably wonder what Carnap’s pragmatism could possibly have in common with 
Collingwood’s idealism. After all, Carnap is often seen as a champion of the logical positivist’s critique 
of metaphysics, whilst Collingwood is renowned for his defence of the possibility of metaphysics 
against the attack to which Ayer subjected it. The answer is that they have more in common than one 
might suspect and that, once the relevant qualifications are made, there is as much convergence as 
there is contestation between Carnapian pragmatism and Collingwoodian idealism. 
Introduction 
It is sometimes said that when it comes to metaphysical questions philosophers exhibit two casts of 
mind: they are either curious or quizzical. Curious philosophers believe metaphysical questions to 
have substantive answers which it is the task of the philosopher to discover from the proverbial 
armchair. Metaphysical questions, curious philosophers would concede, are hard to answer but they 
are not impossible to answer. Quizzical philosophers, on the other hand, do not believe metaphysical 
questions to have genuine answers. Metaphysical questions are not simply hard to answer; they are 
unanswerable. Metaphysical questions, so quizzical philosophers argue, are unlike questions which 
arise within the first order sciences, questions such as “how many fish are there in the sea?” or “who 
is responsible for the Lockerbie disaster?” The answers to these questions may not be easy to come 
by, but the questions themselves are in principle answerable. Unlike such hard but answerable 
questions, metaphysical ones are unanswerable because they arise from conceptual confusion. 
The distinction between curiosity and quizzicality was introduced by Yablo and Gallois (Yablo and 
Gallois 1998) who identified the attitude of curiosity with the “analytic movement’s official 
attitude”, the one which has generally prevailed “after a period of ordinary-language-inspired 
quizzicality” (Yablo and Gallois 1998: 231). Though originally introduced to distinguish between 
different phases within the analytic tradition, Yablo and Gallois’ distinction could be easily adapted 
to capture the relation between idealists and pragmatists. Hegel, the prototypical idealist, is often 
(rightly or wrongly) regarded as the arch-rationalist metaphysician who sought to restore confidence 
in our ability to know the ultimate structures of reality after a period of misguided Kantian humility.2 
Pragmatists, on the other hand, have tended to be suspicious of the notion of metaphysical truth. 
Rorty explicitly claimed that “The pragmatist... does not think of himself as any kind of 
metaphysician” (Rorty 1982: xxviii) and more recently Huw Price has clearly allied himself with the 
deflationary approach favoured by philosophers of a quizzical cast of mind (Price 2009). Yet, whilst 
1 I would like to thank one of the anonymous referees of this paper for their helpful suggestions. 
2 The reading of Hegel as the prototypical arch-rationalist metaphysician has been questioned by scholars such 
as Robert Pippin (Pippin 1989) and Terry Pinkard (Pinkard 1994) who read Hegel as radicalizing Kant’s 
Copernican turn and eliminating the sceptical remainder in Kant without returning to a form of pre-critical 
metaphysics. 
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the distinction between the attitude of curiosity and of quizzicality would appear to be tailor-made 
to capture the relation between idealists and pragmatists, reality is always more complex than it 
looks at first glance, for the devil, as the saying goes, is always in the detail. In the following I will 
consider the strange case of an idealist and a pragmatist who agree on much more than one might 
otherwise expect in the light of their professed philosophical allegiances. In fact, once one excavates 
a little one finds more convergence than one might expect across the ideological divide which 
allegedly separates them. 
In the following I begin by outlining Carnap’s internal/external distinction and argue that Carnap’s 
identification of metaphysical questions with pseudo-questions concerning the truth/falsity of 
linguistic frameworks bears remarkable similarities to Collingwood’s claim that there is no such thing 
as presuppositionless knowledge and that traditional metaphysics, understood as a science of pure 
being, is not a possible enterprise. I then suggest that Carnap’s introduction of the distinction 
between internal and external questions and Collingwood’s introduction of the distinction between 
propositions and presuppositions enables them to evade the self-refutation objection that is often 
raised against logical positivism. I conclude by arguing that whilst Collingwood and Carnap belong to 
different philosophical traditions they share a quizzical attitude towards philosophical questions and 
that we gain a deeper understanding of the nature of Collingwood’s metaontology if we read it 
through the lens of Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 
 
Carnap on internal and external questions 
In “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” Carnap distinguished between ontological or existence 
questions which arise within a linguistic framework and ontological or existence questions applied to 
linguistic frameworks (Carnap 1950). He argued that ontological questions which arise within a 
framework are legitimate internal questions, whereas questions about the existence or reality of the 
framework itself are external and illegitimate. Carnap’s distinction between legitimate internal 
questions and illegitimate external ones is underwritten by the view that there are no framework-
independent ontological viewpoints available to the metaphysician and thus that existential 
questions are unanswerable independently of the framework within which they arise. Consider, for 
example, the question “How many odd numbers are there between 0 and 100?” This is an internal 
question which can be answered by referring to the rules of the “number” framework. Now consider 
the question “Are there numbers?” or “Do numbers exist?” This question may be construed either as 
an internal or as an external question.  If construed as an internal question it will have a trivially true 
answer. Given that “100 is a number” (and this is analytic), that “There are numbers” follows from 
the analytic statement “100 is a number”. No one who asks the question as an internal question 
expects anything other than a trivially true affirmative reply. Yet, Carnap says, philosophers take the 
answer to this question to be neither trivially true nor necessarily affirmative. This indicates that 
they construe the question in a different way, that is, not as an internal question with a trivially true 
answer but as an external question with genuine cognitive content that could potentially be 
answered in the negative. The question “Are there Numbers”, as asked by philosophers, is about the 
reality of the number framework; it is about whether or not numbers exist independently of the 
adoption of the framework or whether the framework itself is real. Carnap objects that, construed in 
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this way, the question cannot be given a cognitive interpretation and is thus a pseudo-question to 
which there is no meaningful answer. Frameworks, for Carnap, can be of a logical or of a factual 
nature. The “number” framework is of a logical nature. The “thing” framework (the spatio-
temporally ordered system of observable objects) on the other hand is a framework of a factual 
nature. In a factual framework, to recognize something as real is “to incorporate it into a framework 
of things at a particular space-time position” and questions about such entities are answered by 
empirical investigation. Within this framework questions such as “is the cat on the mat?” will be 
answered empirically. On the other hand, the question “Do spatio-temporal entities exist?” or “Are 
spatio-temporal entities real?” is always answered affirmatively, just as the proposition “There exist 
numbers” or “Numbers are real” is entailed by the commitments to some contingently true 
existential claim such as “There is a cat on the mat”. But when asked as an external question, as a 
question about the reality of the thing framework, the question “Do spatio-temporal entities exist?” 
is an unanswerable question just like the one concerning the reality of the “number” framework. 
Carnap claims that external questions are raised “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, 
but only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and 
the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved.” (Carnap [1950] 2011: 251)) The 
problem that metaphysicians take themselves to be addressing “cannot be solved because it is 
framed in the wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; 
hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” (Carnap [1950] 2011: 251) 
Metaphysical questions such as “Do numbers exist?” have no cognitive content, and thus unlike 
questions such as “How many odd numbers are there between 0 and 100?” they are unanswerable 
pseudo-questions. 
Carnap concedes that questions concerning the adoption of frameworks may be legitimately asked 
but only if they are construed not as questions about the truth or falsity of the framework but as 
pragmatic questions about their utility. One of the key goals of Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics and 
Ontology” is to allow for talk of abstract entities within empiricist epistemology without going “back 
to a metaphysical ontology of the Platonic kind” (Carnap [1950] 2011:249). How can empiricists 
allow for universals, properties, relations etc.? The introduction of frameworks allows them to do so 
without committing themselves to a Platonic ontology by switching from one discourse to another 
when such switching is pragmatically useful: 
Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities 
like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions, etc. They usually feel much 
more in sympathy with nominalists than with realists. As far as possible they try to avoid 
any references to abstract entities and to restrict themselves to what is sometimes 
called a nominalistic language, i.e., one not containing such references. However, within 
certain scientific contexts it seems hardly possible to avoid them. In the case of 
mathematics, some empiricists try to find a way out by treating the whole of 
mathematics as a mere calculus, a formal system for which no interpretation is given or 
can be given. Accordingly the mathematician is said to be speaking not about numbers, 
function, and infinite classes, but merely about meaningless symbols and formulas 
manipulated according to given formal rules. In physics it is more difficult to shun the 
suspected entities... A physicist who is suspicious of abstract entities may perhaps try to 
declare a certain part of the language of physics as uninterpreted and uninterpretable, 
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that part which refers to real numbers as space-time coordinates or as values of physical 
magnitudes, to functions, limits, etc. More probably he will just speak about all these 
things like anybody else but with an uneasy conscience, like a man who in his everyday 
life does with qualms many things which are not in accord with the high moral principles 
he professes on Sundays.” (Carnap [1950] 2011: 249) 
Carnap’s internal/external distinction has a number of important implications. It implies, first, that 
our ontological commitments are dependent upon the adoption of a linguistic framework. Second, 
given that there is a plurality of frameworks, we ought to be ontological pluralists. Ontological 
pluralism is simply the result of framework pluralism combined with view that there is no 
framework-independent ontological viewpoint. Third, and crucially, the internal/external distinction 
alters the status of the principle of verification. For once the internal/external distinction is in place, 
the principle of verification becomes an internal criterion of meaning. Instead of stating that 
sentences which are empirically unverifiable are meaningless simpliciter, it states that they are 
meaningless from the standpoint of an empiricist language/framework. The standard version of 
logical empiricism which was advocated by the members of the Vienna circle, including the earlier 
Carnap, claimed that the principle of verification simply spelled out the conditions for the 
meaningfulness of propositions without any further qualifications: if propositions are neither 
empirically verifiable nor analytic they must therefore be meaningless gibberish.3 Since Carnap’s 
introduction of the internal/external distinction inscribes the principle of verification within a 
“factual/thing” framework, it entails not that metaphysical propositions are meaningless (as the 
standard version of the principle of verification states), but that they are meaningless from an 
empiricist standpoint. As a result, the main legacy of the internal/external distinction is that 
metaphysical questions are confused and unanswerable not simply because they are empirically 
unverifiable, but because they expect the kind of answers that can be given only once a framework 
is in place.  Carnap (at least the Carnap of “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”) can thus be seen 
as a champion of a certain kind of metaphysical deflationism according to which traditional 
metaphysical questions are confused because they seek answers to external questions. On this view, 
the opposing sides in the ontological disputes such as those between realists and nominalists about 
                                                          
3 Richard Creath (2011) argues that Carnap had broken away from the standard version of logical positivism 
with the introduction of the Principle of Tolerance as early as 1935. Once the Principle of Tolerance is 
introduced, “each of the various versions of empiricism (including some sort of verificationism) is best 
understood as a proposal for structuring the language of science. Before tolerance, both empiricism and 
verificationism are announced as if they are simply correct. Correspondingly, what Carnap called metaphysics 
is then treated as though it is, as a matter of brute fact, unintelligible. But what is announced thus 
dogmatically can be rejected equally dogmatically. Once tolerance is in place, alternative philosophic positions, 
including metaphysical ones, are construed as alternative proposals for structuring the language of science.” 
(section 4.1: Empiricism, Verificationism and Anti-metaphysics.) For an account of authors who read Carnap as 
a champion of logical positivism see Carus 1999. For a rejection of the standard reading of Carnap as a logical 
positivist see Friedman 2007 and 2009a. The interpretation of Carnap given here is close to Friedman’s neo-
Kantian reading but it is no way uncontroversial since many still see Carnap’s philosophical programme as a 
continuation of traditional empiricism. For a discussion of empiricist and neo-Kantian readings see Wagner 
(2009).  
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universals simply fail to recognize that ontological commitments are framework-dependent. Once it 
is acknowledged that ontological questions are internal questions, the dispute is deflated.4  
The metaphysical deflationism which arises from Carnap’s introduction of the internal/external 
distinction bears some unexpected and yet remarkable similarities to Collingwood’s critique of 
traditional metaphysics as a presuppositionless science of pure being in An Essay on Metaphysics. 
(Collingwood: 1940) As we shall see Collingwood, like Carnap, denied that that there is any such 
thing as knowledge of being qua being and accepts the ontological pluralism which ensues from 
framework pluralism. Even though Collingwood does not share the more overtly therapeutic 
implications which are often associated with Carnapian deflationism, since he argues not just against 
traditional metaphysics but also for a metaphysics of a different kind, he clearly endorses the 
Carnapian view that frameworks may not be tested for truth and falsity in the same way as elements 
internal to a framework can.  
Collingwood on absolute presuppositions 
Collingwood shared Carnap’s view that it is not possible to give any cognitive content to the external 
questions asked by traditional metaphysicians. In so far as traditional metaphysics investigates what 
there is or exists independently of any presupposition, it endeavours to be a science of “pure being” 
which yields unmediated knowledge of reality, what Kant would have called reality as it is in itself. 
Collingwood argues that it is a mistake to think of presuppositionless knowledge as a kind of 
knowledge because knowledge claims can be made only against the background of certain 
presuppositions which determine what count as true or false answers to the questions we ask. Since 
there can be no such thing as presuppositionless knowledge, metaphysics as traditionally construed 
has no possible object of enquiry. What then is the subject matter of philosophy? Does it follow that, 
since metaphysics has no subject matter, all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems and 
philosophy has no genuine subject matter of its own? Carnap argued that since questions which seek 
for framework-independent answers have no cognitive content there is no such thing as what is 
regarded as the traditional subject matter of philosophical enquiry. Collingwood by contrast argues 
that frameworks are the very object of investigation of metaphysical analysis because philosophers 
are concerned with uncovering the higher level principles which govern forms of enquiry. The 
philosopher, however, is not concerned with the truth of such principles but rather with the logical 
role that they play in making forms of enquiries possible. To explain this we need to consider 
Collingwood’s account of metaphysics as a science of presuppositions. 
Collingwood distinguishes between presuppositions and propositions.5 Whether a statement is a 
presupposition or a proposition, for Collingwood, is determined by the role that it plays in the asking 
and answering of questions. A statement is a presupposition in so far as it is an assumption from 
                                                          
4 In the contemporary metaontological debate Carnap is often invoked as the figure behind the view that 
apparently intractable philosophical disagreements such as those between endurantists and perdurantists, 
mereologists and anti-mereologists and between the scientific and the manifest image are the result of a 
dogmatic commitment to a framework. See the essays by Hirsch, Price and Thomasson in Chalmers 2009. For 
Carnap’s influence on the contemporary metaontological debate see Eklund, M. (2013 and forthcoming). 
5 See Collingwood 1940, 1998 pp. 21-33. 
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which questions arise. A statement is a proposition if is offered in answer to a question. In this 
respect a statement may be compared to a football player who will be classed as a defender if his 
role is to keep the ball away from the goal keeper or as a forward if his role is to score goals when his 
playmates pass him the ball. Much as what defines a player on the football pitch is the role he is 
assigned in the game (to attack or to defend), so what determines whether a statement is a 
proposition or a presupposition is not its propositional content but the role the statement plays in 
what Collingwood calls the “logic of question and answer”. Thus for example the statement “There is 
beer in the fridge” could be offered in answer to the question “Is there anything to drink?” In this 
case it would be a proposition because its role would be to answer a question. But if it were an 
assumption giving rise to the question “Could you fetch the beer from the fridge, please?”, then it 
would be not a proposition but a presupposition, much as the player who is moved from attack to 
defence would no longer be a forward. 
Collingwood refers to the power of presuppositions to give rise to questions as their “logical 
efficacy” and argues that the truth or falsity of presuppositions is irrelevant to the power they have 
to give rise to questions. The question “Could you fetch the beer from the fridge?” would arise from 
the presupposition that there is beer in the fridge, even if there were in fact none. The statement 
“There is beer in the fridge” thus has logical efficacy not in so far as it is true or false but in so far as 
it is presupposed. We understand the questions we are being asked in so far as we understand what 
presuppositions give rise to them whilst we fail to understand questions if we do not understand the 
presuppositions from which they arise.  Thus we understand a child who asks whether Rudolph ate 
the carrot which had been left for him, not because we believe that Santa exists and travels round 
the globe on Christmas night to deliver presents to well-behaved children, but because we 
understand that if one presupposes Santa to exist, then one may legitimately ask if his reindeer 
stopped to replenish itself with the food that one has left him. 
Propositions, unlike presuppositions, have a truth value since questions may be answered truly or 
falsely and it is the role of propositions to answer questions. Presuppositions, by contrast, 
Collingwood argues, have no truth value because their job, qua presuppositions, is to give rise to 
questions. And they give rise to questions not in so far as they are true (or false) but in so far as they 
are presupposed. “Presupposition” and “proposition” are therefore technical terms and whether a 
statement is a proposition or a presupposition is determined by the role that it plays in the logic of 
question and answer, much as whether a football player is a defender or a forward is determined by 
the role he plays in the game of football. Some presuppositions, Collingwood claims, have a very 
special status. They are absolute rather than relative. A presupposition is absolute if it determines 
the kind of questions that can be asked within a certain form of enquiry. An example of an absolute 
presupposition is the sense of causation which is at work in what Collingwood calls the practical 
sciences of nature, sciences such as medicine and engineering. No self-respecting engineer or doctor 
could practice without presupposing a conception of causation as a handle that can be turned to 
produce or prevent the desired effects because to engage in these practices requires presupposing 
that nature can be manipulated to achieve human purposes, wind to generate electricity, vaccines to 
prevent illness etc. In the practical sciences of nature a cause is “an event by producing or 
preventing which one can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be.”(Collingwood 1940: 
296-7) This presupposition is absolute because it cannot be forsaken without undermining the form 
of inquiry it makes possible. Absolute presuppositions may therefore be compared to the rules 
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which govern games such as football. Whilst a football player may be moved from attack to defence, 
and changing his role in the game does not alter the kind of the game that is being played, a football 
player cannot engage the ball with his hands without committing a foul. Similarly, the absolute 
presuppositions which govern one form of enquiry cannot be disregarded without changing the 
subject, much as directing the ball with one’s hands would turn a game of football into one of 
netball. It is not so much that a player cannot choose to direct the ball with his hands rather than his 
feet but rather that if he does then he is no longer engaging the ball within the game of football. 
There are many presuppositions which will be made by the practitioners of a form of enquiry that 
are not absolute. A doctor may presuppose that “smoking causes lung cancer” and, on this basis, 
demand of his patient that she should stop smoking. The presupposition that “smoking causes lung 
cancer” is not absolute, and could, potentially, be offered as an answer to the question, “What is the 
cause of lung cancer?” In this case it will have a truth-value which can be ascertained empirically. 
Whilst some statements can have a double role (as presuppositions or as presuppositions), some 
presuppositions have only one role, that of giving rise to questions, and consequently they can never 
be proffered as genuine answers to (non-rhetorical) questions. Thus for example the absolute 
presupposition that a cause “is an event by producing or preventing which one can produce or 
prevent that whose cause it is said to be” cannot genuinely be questioned by the practitioners of 
those forms of enquiry which the presupposition underwrites. No self-respecting doctor, car 
mechanic or engineer can truly question whether they can intervene in nature to improve the 
human lot. Doctors may question whether some of their relative presuppositions are true. They may 
question whether colds really are caused by viruses or whether smoking really causes lung cancer, 
but they cannot genuinely entertain the possibility that there really are no such things as causes (on 
the handle conception) without jeopardizing the form of enquiry in which they are engaged. This is 
not to say that absolute presuppositions can never be questioned, but rather that the question “Are 
there causes (on the handle conception)?” or “Do causes (on the handle conception) exist?” will be 
deemed to be rhetorical and necessarily answered in the affirmative by the practitioners whose 
form of enquiry is made possible by that presupposition. For if the bite of a mosquito is the 
preventable cause of malaria or if wind can be channelled to produce electricity, then it follows from 
this that it is possible to prevent or produce certain natural events with a view to curing illnesses or 
improving the human lot.  
There are some differences between Carnapian frameworks and Collingwood’s absolute 
presuppositions. Frameworks, for Carnap, are essentially logical or non-logical calculi, i.e. systems of 
axioms and inference rules expressed in a suitable formal language whilst for Collingwood absolute 
presuppositions structure our yet to be analysed modes of inquiry. But there are also clear parallels 
between Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions and Carnap’s views concerning the 
relation between internal and external questions. For Carnap, as we saw, when general existential 
questions about the framework are asked from within the framework they elicit affirmative answers 
which are deemed to be trivially true. For within the “numbers” framework the proposition 
“numbers exist” or “numbers are real” is analytically entailed by the claim that “100 is a number”. 
Analogously that “there exist material objects” is analytically entailed by the claim “there is a 
(spatio-temporally located) cat on the (spatio-temporally located) mat”. What both Collingwood and 
Carnap disallow is that questions concerning linguistic frameworks or in Collingwood’s case, absolute 
presuppositions, may be legitimately asked as external questions demanding non-trivial, 
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substantively true or false answers about the framework itself. Similarly Collingwood rejects the 
view that external ontological questions about the existence of absolute presuppositions have 
genuine answers by saying that metaphysics traditionally conceived as a science of pure being is not 
a possible enterprise because there is no such thing as presuppositionless knowledge of what exists. 
Being can only be known given certain presuppositions, such as those made by historians, natural 
scientists or within the practical sciences of nature. He agrees with Carnap that there is no 
framework-independent ontological commitment since existence questions can be meaningfully 
answered within the absolute presuppositions which govern different forms of enquiry. He too is an 
ontological pluralist and his ontological pluralism is a straightforward implication of his commitment 
to his pluralism concerning absolute presuppositions, taken together with the claim that there is no 
such thing as presuppositionless knowledge.  
 
Collingwood’s ontological pluralism is best gleaned from his discussion of the term “cause” in An 
Essay on Metaphysics, where he tells us that the term “cause” has different meanings in different 
explanatory contexts. Thus while the sense of causation operative within the practical sciences of 
nature is the so-called “handle” conception, the theoretical sciences of nature, such as physics, 
absolutely presuppose a sense of causation that is unconditional. A cause, in the theoretical sciences 
of nature is an unconditional antecedent condition such that if the cause occurs the effect will 
follow.6 Causal answers, according to Collingwood, have to be carefully matched to the kind of why-
questions that are being asked. When they are mismatched the question that is being asked simply 
remains unanswered. As Collingwood puts it: 
if my car fails to climb up a steep hill, and I wonder why, I shall not consider my 
problem solved by a passer-by who tells me that the top of the hill is farther away 
from the earth’s center than its bottom, and that consequently more power is needed 
to take the car uphill than to take her along the level. All this is quite true; what the 
passerby has described is one of the conditions which together form... what I call the 
cause in sense III... But suppose an AA man comes along, opens the bonnet, holds up a 
loose high-tension lead and says: “Look here, sir, you’re running on three cylinders”. 
My problem is now solved... If I had been a person who could flatten out hills by 
stamping on them the passer-by would have been right in calling my attention to the 
hill as the cause of the stoppage; not because the hill was a hill but because I was able 
to flatten it out. (Collingwood 1940: 302-3) 
 
The passerby in Collingwood’s example is a physicist who operates not with the handle conception 
of causation familiar to doctors, engineers and car mechanics alike but with the sense of causation 
operative in the theoretical sciences of nature where the notion of explanation abstracts from any 
human interest in harnessing nature. Different explanatory contexts call for different senses of 
causation. In what Collingwood calls the historical sciences the concept of causation is not efficient 
because what the historian seeks to uncover is the goal or point of action and uncovering this 
requires appealing to a form of explanation that is teleological rather than nomological. A detailed 
discussion of the notion of explanation which is at work in what Collingwood refers to as the 
                                                          
6 For Collingwood’s account of the different senses of the term “cause”, see Collingwood [1940] 1998 p. 285ff. 
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historical sciences and how such explanations differ from those at work in the natural sciences 
cannot be provided in this context.7 But Collingwood’s point concerning the need to match 
causal/becausal answers to the right kind of why-question entails that the questioner’s curiosity will 
not be satisfied unless that is done.8 
Collingwood explicitly developed his account of absolute presuppositions against the principle of 
verification defended by Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic. (Ayer 1936) Updating the Humean fork 
for the twentieth century, Ayer argued that propositions which are not empirically verifiable are 
meaningless (unless they are tautologies). Collingwood replied that absolute presuppositions are not 
rendered meaningless by the verification principle because they are not propositions. Since they are 
not propositions, the notion of truth and falsity does not apply to them. Contrary to what Ayer 
argues in Language Truth and Logic, there are statements which are meaningful even if they are not 
verifiable (empirically or analytically). To assert that absolute presuppositions are meaningless on 
the grounds that they are unverifiable is tantamount to mistaking their role in the logic of question 
and answer. And it is from this failure to understand the role that presuppositions play in the logic of 
question and answer that the misplaced demand that they should be verified arises.  
Collingwood’s critique of traditional metaphysics is thus rather different from the standard logical 
positivist critique of metaphysics according to which claims which are verifiable neither empirically 
nor analytically are meaningless gibberish. From Collingwood’s perspective, the statement ‘causes 
exist’ is not meaningless because it is not empirically verifiable, as Ayer claimed. It is meaningless 
rather because the attempt to verify absolute presuppositions by assigning them a truth value would 
be as nonsensical as the attempt to answer the question “how long is the standard metre?” with 
anything other than an innocent, trivially true answer to an internal question: “It is 100 centimetres 
long.” While it is true to say that Collingwood does share with the logical positivists the view that 
metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is not a possible enterprise, his reasons for saying this are 
                                                          
7 Collingwood was invoked as an ally in the debate against methodological unity in the sciences by W.H. Dray 
who reworked Collingwood’s claim that there are different senses of causation at work in different 
explanatory contexts by arguing that the logical structure of historical explanation is rational not nomological. 
See for example Dray 1957 and 1963. Collingwood’s defence of autonomy of the human sciences was 
informed by his conception of metaphysics as a science of absolute presuppositions and was overshadowed by 
the return of a more robust conception of the nature of metaphysical enquiry. See D’Oro 2012. 
8 Collingwood is often regarded as a historicist or historical relativist who takes absolute presuppositions to be 
relative to groups of people in certain periods of history. On the reading given here Collingwood is a 
contextualist who takes absolute presuppositions to be relative to forms or modes of inquiries rather than to 
time and place. In this respect Collingwood’s notion of absolute presuppositions is closely related to Michael 
Friedman’s discussion of relativized a priori principles and their meaning-constitutive role in the sciences 
(Friedman 2009b). For Friedman such a priori principles are both “genuinely historical and properly 
transcendental”: they are necessary not because they are universally valid but in virtue of their constitutive 
role. Equally for Collingwood absolute presuppositions are not universally valid: different forms of inquiry have 
different absolute presuppositions. Their applicability however is limited not to time and place but to the 
forms of enquiry which they make possible. Thus although absolute presuppositions are not strictly universal 
they are nonetheless necessary in virtue of the role they play in determining the kind of evidence that can be 
given in answer to the questions which they make possible. I have defended this reading in D’Oro 2010. 
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closer to the reasons given by the Carnap of “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” than those given 
by Ayer’s Language Truth and Logic. Bringing Collingwood in closer proximity to Carnap thus helps to 
counter the objection that in an attempt to make his presuppositional analysis respectable to logical 
positivists Collingwood unwittingly ended up conceding too much to logical positivism (Beaney 
2001:118 and  2005:45ff). Collingwood (just like Carnap) would endorse this principle only in a highly 
qualified way, as a heuristic principle of empirical investigation, and thus as a presupposition 
constitutive of empirical science rather than a universal criterion of meaning.9 Metaphysical 
questions, for Collingwood, are unanswerable rather than simply hard to answer because they are 
external questions about the presuppositions which establish the criteria for making true/false 
claims. Logical positivists simply assumed that the criteria for meaningfulness applicable within one 
form of enquiry are universally applicable in all explanatory contexts because they prioritized the 
explanatory framework of the natural sciences. But in doing this they also fell foul of the self-
undermining objection: “Is the verificationist principle an empirical proposition? Is it analytic?” If it is 
neither, then it fails to pass its own test for meaningfulness. According to the self-undermining 
objection, the principle is self-undermining because it is not a (verifiable) proposition. Logical 
empiricists construed the principle as a universal criterion of meaning and as a result they struggled 
to accommodate the principle of verification within their version of the Humean fork; Carnap and 
Collingwood side-step the objection by construing the principle as a criterion of meaning that is 
constitutive of empirical investigation. 
For Collingwood the principle of verification would be vulnerable to the self-refutation objection if it 
were a proposition, but it is not if the principle in question is construed as a presupposition. For 
presuppositions are never advanced as knowledge claims. What the metaphysician propounds, for 
Collingwood, is not the proposition (for example) that “causes (qua handles) exist or are real” but 
rather this proposition: that “causes (qua handles) exist is presupposed in the practical sciences of 
nature”. The metaphysician makes no higher-level knowledge claim. For the task of metaphysics is 
not to advance knowledge, in the manner of the first-order scientist, but to advance our 
understanding of the presuppositions on which our knowledge rests. As Collingwood put it in An 
Essay on Philosophical Method, philosophy 
does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of which we were 
simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way things which we already 
knew in some way… (Collingwood 1933: 161) 
 
Collingwood’s logic of question and answer is thus not a new kind of logic alongside deductive and 
inductive logic.10 Its goal is not to generate new empirical knowledge by means of inductive 
                                                          
9 The account of Collingwood’s relation to logical positivism provided here differs in some important respects 
from other readings of Collingwood which see an Essay on Metaphysics as making far too many concessions to 
logical positivism. This view is articulated in Beaney 2005. For a critique of this, see D’Oro 2014. Reading An 
Essay on Metaphysics as espousing an internal/external distinction along the lines of Carnap also lends support 
to the view that in An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood defended a form of explanatory contextualism rather 
than espousing a form of historical relativism that is absent in his earlier work. For a more sympathetic reading 
of the logic of question and answer, see D’Oro 2014 and 2002 and Martin 1998. 
10 For a discussion of the logic of question and answer see Belnap and Steel 1976. 
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inferences, or expand our repertoire of a priori truths by means of deductive inferences, but to make 
explicit the forms of inference though which first-order knowledge is gained.  
There clearly are strong points of contact between Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions and 
Carnapian frameworks. Carnap, as we have seen, introduced frameworks to offer a solution to the 
problem that empiricists encounter with abstract entities. How can empirically minded scientists 
make use of mathematics with a clear conscience? They can do so, Carnap argued, by switching to 
the “numbers” framework if this is pragmatically useful to their investigation. Though Collingwood’s 
goal was hardly that of enabling empirical scientists to use the language of abstract entities, he too 
was aware that the absolute presuppositions which govern different forms of inquiry criss-cross one 
another and that the practitioners of a science will often need to wear a different hat or, as Carnap 
might put it, switch from one framework to another. Doctors will acknowledge that whilst they can 
prevent malaria they cannot prevent human beings from ultimately dying, any more than 
astronomers can alter the orbits of the planets. To the extent that they acknowledge this they also 
acknowledge that there is a sense in which the term “cause” has a meaning which is strictly speaking 
banned by the framework in which they operate (qua doctors). The metaontological distinction 
between the theoretical and the practical sciences of nature, therefore, will not neatly map onto the 
kind of explanations which one finds in medicine and in physics. But the fact a doctor must concede 
that there are patients his medicine cannot fix does not entail that there is no distinction between 
the meanings that the term “cause” has in different explanatory contexts. Earthquakes and tsunamis 
will be mentioned in history books, not because historians assume that natural phenomena, like 
coups d’état or revolutions, should be explained teleologically by appealing to motives and 
purposes, but because reality is a complexly woven pattern. An historian will work on evidence that 
is passed on by forensic archaeologists whose carbon dating techniques belong to the natural rather 
than the human sciences. It is precisely the task of the philosopher to tease the differently coloured 
threads out of the complexly woven explanatory tissue. The philosophical distinction between the 
absolute presuppositions which govern forms of enquiries will inevitably be abstractions from the 
tightly knit web of explanations which co-exist in practice and it is therefore unlikely that there will 
be a very precise match between academic departments/disciplines in universities and the forms of 
enquiries which are made possible by the absolute presuppositions the metaphysician uncovers. In 
reality we may find a forensic archaeologist dating fragments of pots by using the same methods 
with which a palaeontologist dates dinosaur bones, working side by side with a hermeneutically 
oriented archaeologist seeking for answers to teleological questions. Indeed the forensic and 
hermeneutically oriented archaeologist may be one and the same person asking questions which are 
underpinned by one set of absolute presuppositions on one occasion and by a different set on 
another. The goal of philosophical clarification is not to sanitize all historical textbooks from 
explanations which are not of a strictly teleological nature. But the fact that the distinction between 
absolute presuppositions is an abstraction from the complex explanatory tissue does not entail there 
is no value in the philosopher’s attempt to single out the differently coloured threads for the sake of 
achieving greater intellectual clarity.  
There clearly are also significant differences between the Carnap of “Empiricism, Semantic and 
Ontology” and the Collingwood of An Essay on Metaphysics which have been ignored here. 
Collingwood saw the investigation of ontological questions internal to forms of enquiries as the only 
form that metaphysics could take in order to thrive and was happy to give the name of 
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“metaphysics” to an investigation into the absolute presuppositions which structure our knowledge. 
He also believed the value of philosophical enquiry to lie in a form of meta-level conceptual 
clarification. Carnap, by contrast, remained wedded to the empirical framework and even if he 
conceded that one could switch to non-factual frameworks for pragmatic reasons, he would not 
have been eager to embrace metaphysics, even as construed by Collingwood. Yet it is clear from this 
discussion that the “isms” in idealism and pragmatism should not be allowed to congeal into 
mutually exclusive ideologies with no points of contact. For while there is certainly some value in 
classifying philosophers into pragmatists and idealists, much as there is in classifying them into 
rationalists and empiricists, there is also a need to treat these classifications with a pinch of salt. For 
the devil, as always, is in the detail and on closer inspection an idealist such as R.G. Collingwood 
turns out to have considerably more in common with philosophers of a quizzical than of a curious 
cast of mind. 
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